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Will Serbia Become a Threat to Macedonia?

Written by the Think-Tank Group for Macedonian and American Affairs

Our first reaction to the claim that Serbia will soon pose as a threat to Macedonia is skepticism. After all, it seems as if Serbia has too much on her plate to handle - adding her southern neighbor to the dish may seem irresponsible and foolish. However, there are just as many reasons for why Serbia may become more aggressive towards Macedonia as there are reasons why Serbia should not act aggressively towards Macedonia. In this essay we will briefly highlight a couple factors and reasons why Serbia may assume an increasingly hardliner approach to Macedonian interests within the next decade. The hypothetical atmosphere surrounding some of these reasons does not suggest they are unlikely or improbable.
First, concerning the upcoming political battle in Serbia: If Serbia embarks along a path that firmly rejects NATO and EU, it will clearly align them with Russia. We are well too aware of Russia's strategic need to regain a stronghold in the Balkans. And since Greece has consistently been on the opposing side of the USA and many NATO countries, and since Russia and Greece are warming up to each other because of Balkan interests, it may be no surprise to see Serbia joining Russia and Greece in an even firmer anti-USA and anti-NATO stance, which would thus put them in opposition to Macedonia (who is relying on the USA, NATO and EU).
This Russian-Greek-Serbian alliance is welcoming to all involved parties for a variety of reasons. As alluded to earlier, Russia has itself convinced that is on the verge of being able to compete with the West again. But before it is capable of competing, it needs to rebuild strategic partnerships and expand its empire beyond ex-Soviet states. For Russia, controlling the distribution and supply of oil in the Balkans is an economic advantage. It's good for Russians if they can get two of the largest and strongest Balkan nations under their wing (Serbia and Greece). But simultaneously they need (to the greatest extent possible) to force out NATO and USA from the Balkans. If they can minimize the presence of USA in the Balkans, they can attempt to carry out their agenda.
This is where Macedonia and Greece come into play. Macedonia is on the verge of being sucked into the NATO vacuum. If Russia can delay Macedonian interests, then this gives them more time to maneuver and strategize; and in their hopes, destabilize the Balkans in order to interrupt USA interests in the Balkans (Macedonia) regarding oil and military expansion. How can Russia do this without appearing to be the bad guys? By using the ongoing Greek hysteria over the name issue. Russia does not have to publicly support Greece on the name issue, and they do not have to publicly disagree with the Macedonians. (After all, if they somewhat succeed in shutting NATO off to the Balkans, they would then want to appear as a shining alternative for the Macedonians). Greece and Russia working together behind closed doors would be a promise of Russian investment in Greece (think oil), a strategic blockade of U.S. interests in the Balkans for the Russians, and a continued opportunity for Greece to masquerade their injustices within their own borders and to bury their past wrongdoings towards Macedonia(ns) deeper in the ground.
And now we finally arrive to the point: Serbia tagging along with Greece and Russia to hamper Macedonian political interests. The main reason stems from the fact that Serbia is weaker, and if they decide to turn away from NATO and EU, they will have to choose the only other side: the Russians and the Greeks. Serbia does not want to be alone in the Balkans (and, after decades of witnessing their visions of a strong Serbian nation diminish, they will desire to rebound); Russia needs to use Serbia; and Greece would also like another friend to achieve her aims. Hence, Serbia aligns herself with those who are aligned against US interests. Thus, Serbia aligns itself with those who are against Macedonian interests (since Macedonia's interests strongly depend on the US).
Second, concerning the recognition of Kosovo by Macedonia: It is very probable that Macedonia will recognize Kosovo soon. Whether they should and what the consequences of this recognition may be are for another topic. However, if our first reason (Serbia aligning with Russia and Greece) isn't enough of a reason for Serbia to have personal animosity toward Macedonia, Macedonia's recognition of Kosovo will surely spark that animosity in the best of ultranationalist propagandists in Serbia.
Serbia is already beginning to feel isolated from the Western powers. Naturally, many Serbians are reacting emotionally to this situation. Although Serbia cannot do any serious harm or damage to the interests of the Western powers in the near future, they can do serious damage to the interests of Macedonia if Macedonia recognizes Kosovo and if Greece and Russia succeed in halting US interests at Macedonia's doorstep. And although it may seem that Serbia's propaganda machine claiming that Macedonians are really southern Serbs has been packed away and thrown in the closet, the machine still works and can be pulled out of storage anytime. Of course, tied in with a Greek-Russian alliance, the Serbians would be supporting Greek injustice toward the Macedonians and the Macedonian nation, which in return would bolster support from Greece and Russia for the Serbs.
So what can Serbia do to Macedonia? At first it really wouldn't matter what Serbia would do since the move would be symbolic. However, if US and NATO interests fail in Macedonia and leave a weak Macedonia to practically fend for herself, who knows the damage that a Greek-Serbian union (backed by Russia) could do (not even mentioning Bulgarian and Albanian interests). Serbia would love the chance to manipulate Macedonia because of what they will seemingly see as the "southern Serbs'" betrayal of mother Serbia on a common problem: the Albanian agenda. (At the very least, that will be the platform the politicians use to sell their anti-Macedonian stance to the Serbian citizens.) From creating economic and political instability, to a more radical nationalist agenda of embargos and verbal threats or action, Serbia may find a new opening in Macedonia within the next decade to make up for the losses they endured in Kosovo and Bosnia in the past fifteen years.
If NATO and U.S. interests fail in the Balkans, the only reason Serbia has not to meddle in Macedonian affairs is because they have too much to handle with Bosnia, Kosovo, and internal politics (mainly the fight between the pro-West sympathizers and Serbian nationalists). A common Albanian problem and Orthodox unity would hardly factor in the political decisions. But it seems as if Serbia would have nothing to lose and something to gain by joining with Greece and Russia to bully Macedonia. This is just another reason why Macedonia and Macedonians must continue to fight for American and NATO support.